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GEORGE LELOUDAS: RISK AND LIABILITY IN AIR LAw
JONATHAN M. HOFFMAN*
T HE TITLE OF George Leloudas's new book, Risk and Liabil-ity in Air Law,' is something of a misnomer. Not to quibble,
but a more precise title might have been, "Risk and Liability in
International Air Law." However, this modest distinction helps to
reveal the differences between Leloudas's British and European
perspective of aviation law and an American one, where domes-
tic law governs aviation claims far more frequently.
Leloudas brings an impressive background in international
aviation law to his subject matter. He currently practices at the
London-based aviation firm of Gates and Partners. According
to the firm's website, he is admitted to practice in England and
Wales, and is also a member of the Athens Bar Association.' He
recently earned his Ph.D. in law at Trinity Hall, Cambridge Uni-
versity (this book is a product of his Ph.D. dissertation).' He
served as an assistant to the legal counsel of the International
Union of Aviation Insurers (IUAI), providing support in rela-
tion to the replacement of the Rome Convention on Surface
Damage.4
The website describes Risk and Liability as "the first book to
analyse the relevant international conventions governing the lia-
bility of airlines to passengers and third parties on the ground
from a risk perspective."5 The key phrase here is "from a risk
perspective"-a view of contemporary social expectations of
* Mr. Hoffman is a senior partner in the firm of Martin, Bischoff, Templeton,
Langslet & Hoffman LLP, with offices in Portland, Oregon, and Anchorage,
Alaska. He received his B.A. in history from Harvard University, magna cum
laude, in 1970, and his J.D. from the University of Oregon School of Law in 1975.
1 GEORGE LELOUDAS, RISK AND LIABILrrY IN AIR LAw (Informa, London 2009)
[hereinafter RISK AND LIABILrrYI.
2 GATES AND PARTNERS, http://www.gatesandpartners.com/content/cc_89.asp.
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how air disasters and similar risk-producing events are viewed
and dealt with by a society that is increasingly risk-averse. The
book does not simply chronicle the evolution of the Warsaw
Convention and its successors, but infuses that discussion with a
thoughtful critique of the judgments upon which those interna-
tional agreements have been crafted.
Leloudas's detailed account of the evolution of international
agreements relating to air law is thorough and noncontroversial.
It follows two, not altogether parallel, tracks. The first track fol-
lows a series of agreements, beginning with the 1929 Warsaw
Convention, and culminating in the 1999 Montreal Convention,
which govern liability for international transportation of persons
and goods by air carriers. The second track follows a series of
agreements (the 1933 Rome Convention, as modified by the
Rome Convention of 1952 and the 1978 Montreal Protocol),
which relate to damage caused by foreign aircraft to third par-
ties on the ground. He also summarizes recent efforts to reach
international agreement covering the risks of terrorism, particu-
larly in the wake of the tragic events of September 11, 2001.6
With respect to liability to passengers, Leloudas points out
that the Warsaw Convention, drafted at the dawn of interna-
tional commercial aviation, was principally designed to establish
a "control system" for personal injuries "that would provide the
legal basis for carrier operations without stunting the industry's
growth."7 The Warsaw Convention established a system of air
carrier liability based on a presumption of fault with a reverse
burden of proof on the carrier to establish available defen [s]es"
(most notably, that the carrier had taken "all necessary measures
to avoid the damage or that it was impossible . . . to take such
measures").' Damages were capped unless the passenger could
prove willful misconduct.10 The Montreal Convention ulti-
mately readjusted the risk allocation by raising the limits of lia-
bility and by marginalizing the fault element-waiving the "all
necessary measures" defense for claims up to $75,000 and re-
taining the quasi-strict liability regime of the Warsaw Conven-
6 RISK AND LIABILITY, supra note 1, 1L 7.138-.153.
7 Id. 4.7.
8 Id. 4.12 n.17.
9 Id.
1o Id. 4.12. As these provisions describe, the interpretation of these provi-
sions evolved over a lengthy period of time following adoption of the Warsaw
Convention. Id. I 4.27-.38.
622 [ 75
GEORGE LELOUDAS
tion.11 However, the Montreal Convention did not go so far as
providing a no-fault compensation system. Passenger claimants
still needed "[(1)] to prove the occurrence of an 'accident;'
[(2)] to ascertain whether the 'accident' took place aboard the
aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking
or disembarking; [and (3)] to establish a causal link between
the 'accident' and the claimants' injuries/death." 2
Two successive Rome Conventions for damage caused by air-
craft to third parties on the ground imposed upon airlines a
higher liability standard from the outset-near-absolute liability
rather than the presumed-fault standard of the Warsaw Conven-
tion.1 3 The rationale for the different standard was that persons
on the ground, unlike passengers, have not accepted part of the
risk.14 In 1978, the 1978 Montreal Protocol increased the liabil-
ity limits and authorized countries to require aircraft operators
to maintain insurance coverage or other security to cover liabil-
ity up to the amounts specified in the Protocol.1 5 The Montreal
Protocol did not address the ramifications of terrorist or other
intentional acts causing damage to persons or property on the
ground."
In addition to recounting the evolution of these international
agreements, Leloudas analyzes the failure of those agreements
to keep pace with changes in social expectations. Until recently,
he argues, our society was governed by a "science-centric ration-
ality."1 7 People assumed that risk could be controlled by scien-
tific competence. 1 However, an "uncertainty of trust" has
arisen from society's media-driven perception of sensationalized
air disasters and a need to assign blame even for risks that
Leloudas believes are beyond the industry's control." Improve-
ments in airlines' actual safety practices, as well as air transporta-
tion's superior safety record compared to that of alternate
means of transportation,2 0 have not produced a corresponding
11 Id. 4.92.
12 Id. 4.98.
13 Id. 1 7.10, 7.50-.52.
14 Id. 11 7.10, 7.52.
15 Id. 11 7.100-.101.
16 Id. I1 7.107-.108.
17 Id. 1 8.2.
18 Id.
19 See id. 11 8.4-.5; see also 1 2.37-.39.
20 One cannot help but acknowledge the comment from the English comedy
revue, Flanders and Swann's "At The Drop of Another Hat," (1964), that flying is
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increase in the public's level of trust.2 1 Leloudas believes that
damages sustained in international aviation accidents should be
compensated without reliance on traditional tort principles.
Otherwise, he argues, mass media will inevitably sow doubt and
skepticism concerning airlines' risk management, thereby exac-
erbating the public's distrust of the airline industry.
Rebuilding trust, according to Leloudas, requires a change in
the image of air carriers. This, in turn, must take into account
not only technological safety improvements, but also the social
environment in which air carriers operate.2 2 Although the inter-
national agreements governing airline liability, from Warsaw to
Montreal, have become more generous to injured persons, they
have not kept pace with changing social expectations, and
courts have too frequently retreated to traditional fault-based
and causation-oriented tort analyses to resolve legal issues aris-
ing under those agreements.2 3 Therefore, he argues, interna-
tional agreements should seek to balance the competing
concerns of airlines, passengers, insurers, and society at large by
jettisoning the fault-based legal system. 2 4
Most importantly, Leloudas asserts, international conventions
must go beyond their traditional role of providing an avenue for
corrective justice and "contribute to the overall social trust-
building effort."2 5 If international conventions completely fail
to balance the interests of carriers and passengers so that courts
can satisfy these interests in accordance with "prevailing socio-
technological demands," or if they channel liability indiscrimi-
nately to air carriers "the belief that they are in a better position
very, very safe, even safer than crossing the road, and that the airline bus drivers,
"have instructions to keep the statistics favorable."
21 See RISK AND LIABILITY, supra note 1, f 8.2-.6.
22 Id. 8.7.
25 The foremost example Leloudas cites is the case of Olympic Airlines v.
Husain, 540 U.S. 644 (2004), in which a non-smoker died of an asthma attack
after being forced to sit in the smoking section of the aircraft. Id. 11 5.112-.146.
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld liability. The majority opinion, authored by
Justice Thomas, injected elements of duty and foreseeability into the analysis of
whether the incident was an "accident" under the Warsaw Convention. Even
more troubling to Leloudas was the Court's use of causation to decide what was
an "accident." Under the Husain analysis, then, international air carrier liability
would not be based on the idea of justice as formulated by the drafters of the
Convention, but rather on the judges' conclusions as to what ordinary persons
consider to be accidents. Id. 5.138, 5.161. But see id. 1 5.139-.156 (discussing
dissenting opinion of Justice Scalia).




to manage the risks of the new era" litigation will destroy the
uniformity of the international regime and trigger additional
public distress, disappointment, and sense of betrayal.2 6
The sense of public distrust has been exacerbated in recent
decades because some of the most notorious aviation disasters,
from Lockerbie to 9/11, have been caused by intentional acts of
terrorism, rather than inadequate safety precautions of the air-
lines.2 ' Thus, Leloudas asserts, there has been a tendency to
stretch the current liability system to channel liability to air car-
riers for terrorism risks that cannot be controlled, cannot be
maintained within national boundaries, cannot be delimited to
a certain period of time, and for which personal responsibility
cannot be placed.2 8 Yet the agreements governing liability for
such disasters have not fully accounted for this change.
There is much to commend in Leloudas's analysis. He has
explored the research in the social sciences concerning human
perception of risk. He cites the pioneering work of Paul Slovic
and others,29 which demonstrates that perception of risk affects
trust at least as much as actual risk, and that people rely on
mental shortcuts and rules of thumb in assessing risk rather
than any systematic analysis of the actual available data.s0 The
practical consequence is that members of the traveling public
are usually far more fearful of dying in an air disaster (or of
being bitten by a shark at the beach, for that matter) than in an
automobile crash, even though irrefutable empirical data prove
just the opposite. One need not be an expert in mass media to
realize that, when disasters occur, the media focus public atten-
tion on the most emotionally gripping plot lines, without neces-
sarily contributing to a better technical understanding of
events." This is particularly true in an age when the internet
26 Id. 11 8.8-.9.
27 See id. 1 3.51-.52.
28 Id. If 3.49-.55.
29 In the interest of full disclosure, this writer as a teenager participated in one
of Dr. Slovic's early experiments on the subject of risk, running Slovic's "M&M
machine" at the Lane County Fair, in Eugene, Oregon, in August of 1964-a
device that tested children's propensity for risk. See generally Paul Slovic, Risk-
Taking in Children: Age and Sex Differences, 37 CHILD DEVELOPMENT 169 (1966).
This writer's father was the founder of Oregon Research Institute, where much of
early research on risk was conducted by Drs. Slovic, Lichtenstein, Tversky, and
Kahneman, all of whom are cited by Leloudas. RISK AND LLABILYY, suTa note 1,
at 16 nn.51 & 53-54, 17 n.60, 22 n.97.
3o Id. 11 2.26-28.
31 Id. 1 2.39.
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and the 24-hour news cycle make the public less patient than
ever. Exposing conspiracies in such an environment is more
compelling than identifying innocent or even careless errors in
judgment.3 2 Leloudas is also correct that the deliberate pace of
the investigations, compounded by governmental requirements
of secrecy and the lack of fault finding by accident investigation
authorities, increase the incentives for the media to search for
simplistic alternate causes." These facts of modern life have
real consequences, however. Not only can they result in cata-
strophic economic damage to airlines and manufacturers, but,
according to Leloudas, they can also distract the public and the
regulators from less dramatic, but more effective, safety mea-
sures. Some of the examples Leloudas cites are compelling.
For instance, although the lifetime safety record of DC-10s is
comparable to that of other heavy jet aircraft, they continue to
have a reputation for being unsafe as a result of a series of
highly publicized crashes in the 1970s that prompted the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration (FAA) to decertify the entire fleet
for a brief period.3 4 Front-page headlines of "air-carrier acci-
dents attract 60 times greater attention then AIDS, 1,500 times
greater attention than car crashes, and 6,000 times greater at-
tention than cancer."3 5 In the mid-1980s, a "60 Minutes" broad-
cast concerning a "sudden acceleration" defect in the Audi 5000
resulted in a major recall, millions of dollars of legal claims, and
a loss of reputation of the company, even though an investiga-
tion by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration later
demonstrated that there had never been any defect at all.36
These points support Leloudas's explanation of how the soci-
ety in which we live has evolved into a "risk society," whose pre-
dominant social outlook is no longer based on "tort thinking,"
even though the Warsaw Convention, its successor international
conventions, as well as the law governing domestic aviation liti-
gation, has been built upon traditional tort formulas. Leloudas
concludes that international aviation conventions ought to be
redesigned as "a comprehensive scheme of compensation to the
formal exclusion of litigation and domestic law influences."3
32 See id. 1 2.38.
3 Id. 11 2.47-.50.
3 Id. 2.43.
35 Id. 1 2.44.
36 PETER HUBER, GALILEO's REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 57-74
(1993).
37 RISK AND LIABILITY, supra note 1, 8.14.
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Such a model already exists in the 1971 Guatemala City Protocol
and "the initial drafts of the terrorism Convention for third par-
ties on the ground, as well as the first-party insurance scheme
suggested by Peter Cane."3
However, none of these proposals has ever gained much trac-
tion. The Guatemala City Protocol never went into effect be-
cause the United States refused to ratify it." Early drafts of the
Guatemala City Protocol would have created something tanta-
mount to no-fault compensation, effectively making interna-
tional air-carriers the insurers of their passengers' safety, subject
to an unbreakable liability limit of $100,000.40 In the post-9/11
environment, the no-fault scheme disappeared.
Is Leloudas right in suggesting that such a system, if adopted,
would bring the law governing international air-carrier liability
more in line with contemporary expectations and increase con-
fidence in the airline industry, while giving injured parties a sim-
plified, quick, and fair resolution of their claims? In part, I
think he is. Such a no-fault system might well result in quicker
claims resolution. That, in turn, would provide a significant
benefit to the families of victims of mass aviation disasters and
help them avoid some of the expense, delay, uncertainty, and
emotional turmoil of the litigation system.
But would such a system provide a corresponding reduction
of the public's sense of distrust of airlines and the other large
entities responsible for today's air transportation system? I
doubt it, and here is why.
First and foremost, Leloudas treats the evolution of interna-
tional air-carrier liability law as concerning a triangular relation
between passengers, carriers, and the public. This would be
true enough if we were only talking about domestic aviation.
But when we are dealing with international carriage, there are
more than one "public." There are likely to be a variety of social
expectations and policies among the affected/interested coun-
tries. For example, should a citizen of Nicaragua, injured in the
crash in that country of a flight from Guatemala City, be permit-
ted to litigate a claim against a multinational defendant in the
United States? Although such suits have frequently been dis-
missed under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, abuses
continue to occur, such as when the country where the injury
- Id.
3 Id. 11 4.112-.121.
- Id. 114.113-.116.
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occurred has enacted a foreign blocking statute in an attempt to
force foreign litigation into U.S. courts.4 1 To expose the defen-
dant to such a suit is to impose American-style liability expo-
sures-in breadth as well as magnitude-for airlines based in
other countries, and to provide windfalls for residents of other
countries (whose recoveries can be far larger than what they
would ever reasonably expect under the laws of their own coun-
try or the country where the injury occurred), as long as they
can come under the umbrella of a more generous court in the
United States.4 2
Furthermore, would a no-fault, non-tort compensation system
for international travel actually improve the public's trust of the
airline industry? I seriously doubt it, for two reasons. First, al-
though such a system would almost certainly result in quicker
resolution of claims than the current system, it is doubtful that it
could ever be quick enough to reduce substantially the climate
of distrust that currently arises from the media frenzy following
a major disaster. For example, the post-9/11 claims process,
while deservedly lauded as highly successful, nevertheless took
over two-and-a-half years to complete.4 3 Such a system may well
be worth exploring-if only as a more efficient method for han-
dling claims arising from mass torts-but is unlikely to increase
public trust of the airlines.
Moreover, whatever benefits a no-fault, non-tort system might
have for claims arising in the United Kingdom or Europe, it
would be unlikely to produce any meaningful benefit in public
trust of the airlines in the United States, given that an interna-
tional agreement would not affect domestic claims. Leloudas's
analysis comes from a decidedly European and British frame of
reference. His perspective tends to overlook, or at least greatly
understate, the effect of domestic aviation claims, particularly in
the United States, and perhaps Canada and other large coun-
41 See generally Hal S. Scott, Wat to Do About Foreign Discriminatory Forum Non
Conveniens Legislation, 49 HARv. INT'L L.J. ONLINE 95 (2009) (discussing the tactics
of foreign plaintiffs seeking tort damages awards in U.S. courts).
42 Cf In re Ford Motor Co., 591 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2009) (illustrating the ag-
gressive efforts of foreign nationals injured in foreign accidents to avail them-
selves of jurisdiction in U.S. courts, albeit without success); In re Bridgestone/
Firestone, Inc., Tires Prod. Liab. Litig., 470 F. Supp. 2d 917 (S.D. Ind. 2006).
4 Kenneth R. Feinberg, Special Master of the September 11th Victim Com-
pensation Fund, Policy Statement on Program Shutdown Schedule, http://
wwwjustice.gov/archive/victimcompensation/ShutdownStatement.pdf (last vis-
ited Aug. 26, 2010).
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tries where commercial aviation is predominately domestic.4 4
Indeed, the worst airline-related calamity in history, the 9/11
hijackings, arose from domestic flights, as did other historic air
disasters (such as the 1956 Grand Canyon midair collision that
was pivotal in bringing about the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,
and that arguably shaped America's consciousness of the
hazards of commercial air travel). Understandably, Leloudas
seems to assume that a change in international aviation agree-
ments will have a major impact on aviation claims. This may be
true in the United Kingdom and Western European countries
(as well as Japan), where distances are less and high-speed train
service is a major component of the domestic transportation sys-
tem. In the United States, such an assumption would be
unwarranted.
This distinction matters to the overall effectiveness of the
changes Leloudes advocates. For better or worse, the litigious
nature of the United States probably makes American claims a
much more influential factor in the litigation cost (and insur-
ance premiums) of the world at large-because Americans are
more likely than citizens of other countries to file a lawsuit for
any injury.4 5 Moreover, once litigation is instituted in the
United States, the likely jury verdict and, consequently, the
likely settlement value, is almost certainly larger and less predict-
able than what would be awarded in other countries. It is diffi-
cult to see how changes in international law would significantly
affect the frequency of American domestic claims, the size of
settlements and verdicts, the insurance cost, or the public trust
and perception of the airline industry.
Second, while I have no reason to doubt Leloudas's conclu-
sion that America and Western Europe have transformed into
"risk societies," I question whether the same can be said for very
many of the other signatories to international aviation agree-
- For example, Leloudas states that the increasing number of international
conventions from the mid-1950s through the late-1970s led to more "uncertainty
caused by the increasing complexity and quantity of rules ... leaving carriers in a
state of ambiguity regarding the management of their legal exposures, and leav-
ing passengers with a feeling of discontent." RISK AND LIABLITY, supra note 1, 1
4.75 (citing Richard Gardiner, The Warsaw Convention at Three Score Years and Ten,
24J. AIR & SPACE L. 114, 116 (1999)). Yet I strongly suspect that, at least in the
United States, the vast majority of passengers are utterly unaware of the exis-
tence, let alone the content, of any of these international agreements, let alone
what they provide.
4 Indeed, Americans' love of litigation was noted as early as Alexis de Toc-
queville's writings in the early Nineteenth Century.
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ments, particularly those in the developing world. Indeed, in
expressing concern about the Montreal Convention's proposal
for adding a "fifth jurisdiction" where claimants can bring suit
for damages arising from international flights, the International
Union of Aviation Insurers (IUAI) stated:
A fifth jurisdiction will drive up-quite significantly-the expo-
sures of air carriers, especially in those parts of the world which
do not engage in carriage to high compensation States. This ex-
posure will lead directly to an increase in insurance charges. It is
difficult to justify inviting airlines in the developing world to, in
effect, subsidise the domestic compensation regime in high com-
pensation States.4
Given the expectations gap between "high compensation States"
and the rest of the world in the context of the Montreal Conven-
tion, it seems unrealistic to expect international consensus favor-
ing the no-fault, non-tort system of compensation Leloudas
advocates.
Third, even if such a system could solve the "trust" problem
for the airlines alone-perhaps by instituting a no-fault compen-
sation scheme with unbreakable caps-it would almost certainly
fail to improve the public's trust of the aviation industry as a
whole unless it encompassed the liability exposure of all poten-
tial defendants in aviation disasters. Otherwise, what tends to
happen in the United States now under the Warsaw Convention
and its successors would likely continue. Making the airlines the
beneficiaries of a damages cap will not result in a quick resolu-
tion of the claims for a certain sum, but rather would probably
increase the liability exposure of non-airline defendants exempt
from any cap, such as maintenance facilities, aircraft or compo-
nent manufacturers or servicers, airport operators, or air traffic
controllers." This phenomenon, recently described as the "in-
tegrated industry principle," suggests that limiting the liability
exposure of one party "directly [and adversely] affects the expo-
46 INT'L UNION OF AVIATION INSURERS, AN AVIATION INSURANCE VIEW OF THE
DRAFT CONVENTION FOR THE UNIFICATION OF CERTAIN RULES FOR INTERNATIONAL
CARRIAGE By AIR 4 (1999) [hereinafter IUAI REPORT], available at http://
www.iuai.org/iuai/htdocs/site%20data/position%20papers/ppl.pdf.
4 SeeJennifer L. Anton, A Critical Evaluation of the General Aviation Revitalization
Act of 1994, 63 J. AIR L. & COM. 759, 798-99 (1998) (arguing that the General
Aviation Revitalization Act's statute of repose for general aviation manufacturers
simply transferred the manufacturer's liability exposure to other potential
defendants).
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sure of other parties."" With or without a cap, and with or with-
out no-fault liability, the airline would invariably become
entangled with claims by and against the non-airline defendants
under varying schemes of fault allocation within the United
States. Any scheme establishing rules for airline liability is un-
likely to produce any greater public trust in commercial aviation
than exists at present unless it addresses the liabilities of all in-
dustry participants.4 9
To be sure, Leloudas discusses a number of proposals that
would tend to mitigate this problem by creating a multi-layered
system of caps: a relatively low, unbreakable cap funded by the
airline's liability insurance; a second layer funded by a passenger
surcharge; and the highest layer funded by member govern-
ments.5 0 The United States government created a system similar
to this as part of the air carrier bailout package following the 9/
11 disaster, capping the airlines' liability at the limit of their lia-
bility insurance and having the FAA offer war risk insurance to
the carriers for per-occurrence damages between $50 million
and $4 billion, funded by a ticket tax." But unless the world is
prepared to adopt a comprehensive system for no-fault compen-
sation that quickly and satisfactorily resolves all claims against all
entities, a system limited to resolution of airline claims may not
do as much as Leloudas hopes.
Fourth, I want to agree with Leloudas's contentions that the
tort system is an inefficient, if not ineffective, mechanism for
resolution of international airline crash claims, and that it may
produce a net loss in public confidence, as compared with the
kind of no-fault system he advocates, but his accurate identifica-
tion of the problem does not necessarily recommend his pro-
posed solution. It is difficult to imagine that the media would
suddenly abandon its search for compelling story lines in mass
disasters and cease finger-pointing at malefactors (real and
imagined), simply because a no-fault compensation system is
adopted. It is equally doubtful that any form of no-fault system
would compensate the victims before most of the media finger-
4 Jeffrey Wool, Lessor, Financier, and Manufacturer Perspectives on the New Third-
Party Liability Conventions, 22 AIR & SPACE LAw., no. 4, 2010, at 1, 23.
4 See id. Wool advocates such a comprehensive compensation system for vic-
tims of major terrorist events. See generally id. This approach appears to be consis-
tent with Leloudas's views of the recent proposals for dealing with terrorist-
caused injuries.
50 RiSK AND LIABILITY, supra note 1, 11 7.188-.246.
51 Id. I1 7.121-.125.
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pointing had already taken place, or that it would prevent the
public hearings of various governmental bodies that would inva-
riably follow a media expos6.
But, even more to the point, one must ask why Leloudas as-
sumes that the risk of public distrust, ignited by a disaster, is
necessarily a bad thing. Certainly it can be if, for example, the
public distrusts the DC-10 decades after the problem has been
fixed, despite empirical evidence that the DC-10 is just as safe as
competitors' aircraft. But media attention and government in-
vestigations have on other occasions revealed genuine problems
providing ample grounds for public distrust. Faced with evi-
dence of an actual problem, the best companies devise proactive
responses that demonstrate to the public that they are deserving
of continued trust because of their ability to identify, acknowl-
edge, and rectify a serious problem. McDonnell Douglas lost
public trust with the DC-10, not just because of the FAA ground-
ing, but also because its delay in remedying the defect was re-
vealed during the Watergate scandal. By contrast, Johnson &
Johnson's quick and forthright response to a crisis when news
broke that someone had tampered with its core product by lac-
ing some unspecified number of Tylenol bottles with cyanide
earned the company enormous public trust and respect.53 The
lesson: the best way to prevent or minimize corporate distrust is
for a company to plan adequately for such crises and to be pre-
pared to respond rapidly, and with integrity, after the crisis oc-
curs. The speed by which the company compensates the victims
is never likely to be rapid enough-under any system-to substi-
tute for the measures necessary for a responsible company to
maintain or rebuild public trust.
Nor do I believe that a no-fault compensation system would
have much of a positive effect on claims-even mass tort claims
(such as the large number of claims that arose when passengers
were found to have suffered deep vein thrombosis (DVT) as a
result of sitting on airplanes for long flights)-that do not arise
52 See, e.g., DAVID GERO, AVIATION DISASTERS 125 (2d ed. 1996) (discussing the
"gentlemen's agreement" between the FAA Administrator and the president of
the Douglas division of McDonnell Douglas to downgrade the fix from an Airwor-
thiness Directive to three Service Bulletins, thereby delaying the remedial ac-
tion.); JOHN J. NANCE, BLIND TRUST 139-43 (1986).
5 See Mallen Baker, Companies in Crisis: What to Do When it All Goes Wrong, MAL-
LENBAKER.NET, http://www.mallenbaker.net/csr/crisis02.html (last visited Mar.
1, 2010) (describingJohnson &Johnson's response as an outstanding example of
a company's rapid and appropriate response to a crisis, even when the danger is
not of the company's making).
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from air crashes." Bear in mind the range of recent claims in-
volving such matters as, for example, a medical emergency to a
passenger in flight,55 the detention and bodily search of a pas-
senger prior to boarding,56 or an altercation between a cantank-
erous passenger and the flight crew during flight.57 If an airline
was engaging-or even falsely accused of engaging in-truly im-
proper misconduct (strip searching passengers arbitrarily or for
salacious purposes, for example), the revelation of such allega-
tions would trigger the same public reactions with or without
prompt compensation. Conversely, if a no-fault system permit-
ted easy compensation for false or meritless claims without con-
sidering such elements as fault, causation, comparative fault,
and other tort defenses, the airlines would be buying many dubi-
ous claims-and perhaps encouraging the filing of even more of
them-while gaining little if any "trust" in return.
Even with respect to mass disasters, or compensating injuries
on a mass scale that do not arise from accidents, like DVT, the
idea of "socializing" all such claims to facilitate quick settlements
comes with its own problems because of the inherent tension
between efficiency and fairness. The potential difficulties aris-
ing from the use of more "efficient" mechanisms, such as the
treatment of mass tort claims via various forms of "aggregated"
proceedings, have been explored elsewhere.58 The Seventh Cir-
cuit, which touched on the issue in a different context, illumi-
nated the tension between the inefficiency of more traditional
54 DVT is a serious medical condition. It triggered numerous claims, including
class actions, against the airlines in the United States, the United Kingdom, and
Australia. See RiSK AND LIABILTY, supra note 1, 5.170-.250. In the U.K. litiga-
tion, the plaintiffs and the airlines agreed upon a "factual matrix:" "(i) that the
carriers operated their aircraft in a habitual manner and in accordance with ap-
plicable regulations; and (ii) that the carriers were aware of the risk DVT posed
to the passengers by the flight but took no steps to warn" or otherwise minimize
or eliminate it. Id. at 1 5.180. The legal issues were whether the events causing
DVT were an "accident which caused bodily injury" under Article 17, and
"whether DVT itself [could] be an 'accident' for the purposes of Article 17." Id.
Ultimately, the courts held that DVT sustained aboard aircraft was not an "acci-
dent" within the meaning of the Montreal Convention and therefore the claims
were not compensable. Id. 11 5.199-.200 (citing In re DVT [2006], 1 AC 495
(H.L.)). American courts have also considered the issue. See, e.g., Twardowski v.
Am. Airlines, 535 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2008); Blansett v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 379
F.3d 177 (5th Cir. 2004); In re DVT, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
55 Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644 (2003).
56 El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 (1999).
57 Carey v. United Airlines, 255 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2001).
58 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation ofEntrepreneurial Litigation: Balanc-
ing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHi. L. REv. 877 (1987).
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mechanisms of dispute resolution and a more efficient system
which would disregard "inconvenient" details that otherwise
would merit different cases being treated differently:
The districtjudge did not doubt that differences within the class
would lead to difficulties in managing the litigation. But the
judge thought it better to cope with these differences than to
scatter the suits to the winds and require hundreds of judges to
resolve thousands of claims under 50 or more bodies of law. Effi-
ciency is a vital goal in any legal system-but the vision of "effi-
ciency" underlying this class certification is the model of the
central planner. Plaintiffs share the premise of the ALI's Complex
Litigation Project (1993), which devotes more than 700 pages to an
analysis of means to consolidate litigation as quickly as possible,
by which the authors mean, before multiple trials break out. The
authors take as given the benefits of that step. Yet the benefits
are elusive."
Finally, one must ask why any special treatment should be af-
forded to victims of airline disasters at all. Planes, trains, auto-
mobiles, buses, and watercraft all have accidents (and many are
the targets of terrorism throughout the world as well). Now that
aviation has evolved from a pioneering adventure to an ordinary
means of travel, is there any reason to treat persons injured in
aviation-related events any differently than persons similarly in-
jured by other modes of transportation? Indeed, IUAI made
this very point in response to the Montreal Convention's pro-
posed "fifth jurisdiction":
If it is the wish to introduce some form of fifth jurisdiction op-
tion linked to the domicile or permanent residence of the pas-
senger, then the primary consequence will be the prosecution of
claims by nationals of high compensation states in their own
states regardless of any link between that state and the journey or
the operation of the aircraft in question. Member States may
question why aviation should be singled out for this treatment. Is
the victim of a rail crash not entitled to equal treatment?60
No doubt a strong argument can be made that those injured
in accidents should all receive compensation, without regard to
fault. One suspects that the United States' tort systems are more
solicitous of tort-based claims than most other countries because
there is less of a social safety net for injured persons in the soci-
ety at large. Yet, it is difficult to justify giving victims of aviation-
59 In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1019-20 (7th Cir. 2002).
6o IUAI REPORT, supra note 46, at 4.
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related accidents (or, more precisely, victims of international avi-
ation accidents), special treatment, while other persons with
similar injuries are relegated to traditional tort law.
Furthermore, air transportation is no longer any more exotic
than travel by rail, bus, boat, or automobile, then why does the
"trust" of the airline industry require socialization of injuries any
more than any other mode of transportation, all of which almost
certainly pose greater overall risk to the safety of the traveling
public than aviation? And if quick compensation is deemed
necessary because the public subjectively "perceives" a greater
danger, despite all objective evidence to the contrary, then per-
haps we should socialize injuries from shark attacks and snake
bites instead. Indeed, if I ever get to fly to Australia for a vaca-
tion, I would fear these far more than the flight that takes me
there, despite the irrationality of it."
6] But in defense of such irrational fears, see travel writer Bill Bryson's com-
mentary about Australia:
It has more things that will kill you than anywhere else. Of the
world's ten most poisonous snakes, all are Australian. Five of its
creatures-the funnel web spider, box jellyfish, blue-ringed octo-
pus, paralysis tick, and stonefish-are the most lethal of their type
in the world ... . If you are not stung or pronged to death in some
unexpected manner, you may be fatally chomped by sharks or croc-
odiles, or carried helplessly out to sea by irresistible currents, or left
to stagger to an unhappy death in the baking outback. It's a tough
place.
BILL BRYSON, IN A SUNBURNED COUNTRY 6 (2001).
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